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Abstract
This paper explores the factors influencing the types of policy instruments seriously
considered and actively promoted by US policymakers over time in the climate change
debate.  A variant on Kingdon’s model is used to describe how these factors and actor
groups affect the pool of instrument considered—not only influencing which instruments
go into the pool but also which ones bubble to the top and which ones sink to the bottom
in prominence.  In the model presented in this paper the following three process streams
coupled with influence of time and historical experience determine the prominence of
individual policy instruments in the pool:  (1) a “politics/economics” stream which
contains contextual factors (such as national mood and macroeconomic conditions) that
constrain the type of policy instruments policymakers can consider; (2) a “policy options”
stream which generates and promotes particular policy instruments; and (3) an “issues”
stream which contains the policy goals faced by policymakers at the time.  Actor groups
can affect any of these streams and can act as “policy entrepreneurs” by advocating the
use or disuse of certain instruments.
With regard to formal (i.e., report-like) assessments, this paper finds that although formal
assessments have seemingly had little direct impact on US policy responses in the past, it
is not the case that they have had no indirect impact or will not have a larger direct
impact in the future. This lack of direct impact could be explained by (a) the primary use
of alternative channels of information (e.g., advisors, briefings, memos) by policymakers;
(b) the lack of attention given in assessments to the contextual factors constraining policy
instrument choice; (c) the discrepancies between the goals assumed by assessors (e.g., a
specific environmental goal) and the actual goals faced by policymakers; and (d) the
assessment’s intended audience.
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Introduction
i
The climate change issue has evolved substantially since the 1970’s. Throughout the
1970’s and the early 1980’s, emphasis was placed on determining whether human
activities had any discernible influence on the global climate. Following the discovery of
the ozone hole in 1985 and the hot summer of 1988, attention shifted toward obtaining
international cooperation to address the issue culminating with the signing of the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in Rio in 1992. After the signing of
the FCCC the emphasis shifted again, this time towards obtaining international agreement
on an environmental goal—specifically, what the emissions target should be, within what
timeframe, and how best to achieve the target.
Although policy instruments have been the focus of recent discussions, it is not the case
that their use has only recently been considered. In fact, as elaborated further in this
paper, policy instruments have played a role in the evolution of the climate issue over
time. The goal of this paper is to gain a better understanding of (1) the various factors
influencing policy instrument prominence; (2) how instruments are used to reach specific
policy goals; and (3) the channels through which informational factors such as formal
assessments play a part in the policy instrument decision process.  This paper focuses on
policy instrument prominence rather than choice (i.e., implementation) in order to draw
out the factors that influence which instruments US policymakers seriously consider and
actively promote—instruments that may or may not be actually implemented.  Since little
policy instrument implementation has occurred in the climate issue to date, focusing on
prominence rather than choice seems appropriate for reasons including the availability of
empirical evidence.
2To gain a deeper understanding of these issues, this paper focuses specifically on
international policy instruments for climate change and those considered by the United
States.ii Policy instruments are defined as mechanisms that induce desired changes in
behavior and/or the development and diffusion of particular technologies. Policy
instruments fall into one of four broad categories: (1) technological instruments (e.g.,
energy R&D research funding); (2) market instruments (e.g., taxes, tradable permits, joint
implementation); (3) regulatory instruments (e.g., uniform technology or performance
standards); and (4) institutional instruments (e.g., centralized investment funds like the
Global Environment Facility).
Four central themes emerge from this research and are discussed further in this paper:
1. A variant on the model introduced by John Kingdon is used in this paper to describe
how particular factors influence policy instrument prominence in the climate change
debate.  As shown in Figure 1, three process streams (i.e., a “politics/economics”
stream, a “policy options” stream, and an “issues” stream) and the influence of time
and historical experience impact the pool of policy instruments by affecting the types
of instruments flowing into the pool and which instruments rise and fall in
prominence.  The various actor groups can affect any of these streams and can act as
“policy entrepreneurs” by advocating the use or disuse of certain instruments.
2. Informational mechanisms such as formal assessments can affect the prominence of
policy instruments in the following ways: (a) by providing information directly or
indirectly to the policymakers, the public, and the policy community which causes a
shift in their perceptions, knowledge, and/or interests; (b) by influencing contextual
factors that constrain the feasible set of instruments; and/or (c) by providing
information that causes a shift in policy goals.
3. Although formal assessments have seemingly had little direct impact on US policy
responses in the past, it is not the case that they have had no indirect impact or will
not have a larger direct impact in the future. This lack of direct impact could be
explained by (a) the primary use of alternative channels of information (e.g., advisors,
briefings, memos) by policymakers; (b) the lack of attention given in assessments to
the contextual factors constraining policy instrument choice; (c) the discrepancies
between the goals assumed by assessors (e.g., a specific environmental goal) and the
actual goals faced by policymakers; and (d) the assessment’s intended audience.
4. Reflecting on the model presented in Figure 1, an assessment should be considered
“successful” from the standpoint of policy instrument prominence if it (a) is
instrumental in advancing the issue to the next stage in the issue cycle by affecting
the current policy goals; (b) contributes to the loosening of constraints that define the
set of “feasible” policy instruments allowing policymakers to make a better policy
instrument choice; and/or (c) provides policy-relevant information to policymakers
which allows them to make a more educated policy instrument choice.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief history of US policy
responses since the 1970’s. Section III presents a model of policy instrument prominence
and applies it to the case of climate change policy responses in the U.S.  Section IV
3compares the three steams in the case of the US, discusses the role of assessments, and
raises the question of what constitutes a ‘successful’ assessment from the standpoint of
policy instrument prominence. Section V concludes.
A Brief History of US Policy Responses in the Climate
Change Debate
The Carter Years (1976-1980)iii  
The years of the Carter presidency were a period of heightened interest concerning
human influences on climate. Increased climate research funding to study the impacts of
human activities on climate and increased coordination of climate research efforts among
the various federal agencies were the chosen climate policy responses during this time
period.
In the early 1970’s, federal R&D programs such as the supersonic transport program
began to raise questions concerning the effect of these alternative modes of transport on
climate. These concerns resulted in the development of the Climatic Impact Assessment
Program (CIAP) initiated by the Department of Transportation. Concurrently, increased
international attention was being given to the climate issue. As a result of this
international attention and research coming out of the SCEP (Study of Critical
Environmental Problems) and the SMIC (Study of Man’s Impact on Climate), an
international agreement at the 1972 United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment to increase international CO2 monitoring was signed.
Efforts were also made during this time to improve coordination among the various
national climate research programs being created. This prompted the adoption of the
National Climate Program Act in 1978 which increased the level of climate research
funding and established the National Climate Program Office under the auspices of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The National Climate
Program Office (NCPO) was charged with organizing all federally-funded climate
research.
Coincident with the establishment of the National Climate Program Office was the
second energy crisis of the 1970’s. In response, the Carter Administration began to
explore options to reduce the U.S.’s dependency on foreign oil through the development
of coal-based synthetic fuels. As part of this effort, Carter increased the budget of the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)—later becoming the
Department of Energy—by one million dollars to examine the effects of increased CO2
from the expanded use of coal. This research was seriously curtailed at the end of the
1970’s with the fall in interest in synthetic fuels as a result of declining oil prices.
4The Reagan Years (1980-1988)iv  
Many of the energy R&D funding decisions made by the Carter administration were later
considered poor and excessive by many in the US public. This fed an already existing
national trend toward more conservative views—including the desire for less government
and industry deregulation where preferred actions of private businesses are induced
through market mechanisms. The Reagan administration shared these views and as a
consequence slashed energy R&D funding by more than half.v The Reagan administration
was also keen to preserve the status quo. As a result, the Department of Energy (formally
the ERDA) in the early 1980’s attempted to reduce its climate research budget and funnel
more of its budget to activities that would not threaten a “business-as-usual” strategy.
Congress during these years did not agree with the Reagan administration’s climate
research strategy resulting in numerous battles with the administration over DOE’s
attempt to reduce its climate research budget and the content of its various climate
research programs. Although many members of Congress were more supportive of
specific actions to combat climate change, key members realized that the degree of
scientific certainty needed to move the issue further and to sustain a long-term climate
strategy did not yet exist. This is evident in a remark made by Representative Albert Gore
in a 1982 congressional hearing on the issue in which he disputes a call for remedial
action: “....it does seem to me that if we can elevate the degree of certainty, we will have
a better chance of summoning up the political will to address this problem.”vi
Following the discovery of the ozone hole in 1985, a scientific consensus statementvii
provided in the 1985 Villach report, and the hot summer of 1988, public concern over the
issue rose dramatically. The US’s policy response, however, came in the form of more
attention given to the issue. Noteworthy was the 1987 Global Climate Protection Act
which mandated the development of a coordinated national policy on climate change and
the National Science Foundation Fiscal Year 1987 authorization which specified the
preparation of a report on the U.S.’s plans for international cooperation to combat climate
change. In addition, the climate change issue was becoming more prominent in the
federal government as reflected in an increase in the number of agencies, and House and
Senate committees and subcommittees, and the establishment in 1989 (initially under a
Presidential Initiative and later as part of the 1990 Global Change Research Act) of the
US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP).
The Bush Years (1988-1992)
Reluctance to take further steps towards specific policies to reduce the threat of climate
change continued throughout the four years of the Bush administration. The difference
from previous years was that although policymakers were reluctant to make any firm
policy statements, scientists were not. A consensus statement made by the Villach group
of scientists and a call for a 20% reduction in emissions made by participants of the 1988
Toronto Conference likely raised concerns among U.S. policymakers that they would be
forced to make policy recommendations before it was politically feasible and before key
scientific uncertainties were resolved.viii Such concerns (and the desire to gain control
5over scientific statements) likely lead to the decision by the United Nations General
Assembly to create the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 1988 under the
auspices of the World Meterological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP).ix
Concurrently, other countries were becoming increasingly engaged in the issue,
ultimately leading to the 1990 Second World Climate Conference and the 1992 UN
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). In addition to a United Nations
resolution in 1989 setting up the 1992 UNCED meeting, two meetings attended by
environment ministers of countries within Europe and North America were convened in
which global climate change was discussed: a 1989 meeting in Noordwijk, the
Netherlands, and a 1990 meeting in Bergen, Norway.x Throughout these meetings the
U.S. was reluctant to commit to specific policy actions although Western European
ministers were pressing for CO2 targets based on the “Precautionary Principle” (i.e., even
if the science is uncertain, action should still be taken as a precaution to irreversible
environmental damage).xi
This difference in opinion between the United States and Western Europe continued at
the 1990 Second World Climate Conference held in Geneva, Switzerland. Here members
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
Japan each committed to stabilize CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000—only
the United States did not agree to a binding target.xii The ensuing negotiations resulted in
a weak ministerial declaration which stated that industrialized countries should either
establish targets and/or national programs to control emissions—a requirement that all
countries currently met.
Additionally, the declaration called for the transfer of financial and technological
resources from developed to developing countries to enable developing countries to meet
the incremental costs associated with measures to combat climate change. Perhaps in
response to the need for a mechanism to assist in these transfers, the Global Environment
Facility (GEF) was established originally as a pilot program in October 1991 (and later
restructured and replenished in 1994) to facilitate the disbursement of funds not only for
projects that address global warming but also projects that address biodiversity
conservation, pollution of international waters, and ozone depletion.
Much of the discussion in the Noordwijk and Bergen meetings was in preparation for the
1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development to be held in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. From these initial meetings, however, it was clear that a formal
negotiation body was needed. As a result, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
(INC) was established in a 1990 UN General Assembly resolution to provide a forum for
protocol negotiations in preparation for the UNCED meetings.xiii Five INC meetings were
held prior to the UNCED in 1992.
The international discussions prior to the INC meetings focused on the reduction of CO2
from the energy sector and unilateral action by participating countries—suggestions
which had serious implications for the United States. In an effort to explore other options,
the Bush administration requested the Department of Justice to propose recommendations
on the type of climate policy it should advocate.xiv What resulted was a memo written by
6Richard Stewart and Jonathan Wiener, both of the Justice Department, suggesting a
“comprehensive” approach to policymaking (i.e., the consideration of all greenhouse
gases and all sources and sinks when deciding policy) and the establishment of a tradable
permits market to achieve lower-cost emissions reductions.xv The “comprehensive”
approach was presented by the U.S. at the first INC meeting in February 1991 in a report
titled, “A Comprehensive Approach to Addressing Potential Climate Change.” The idea
of emissions trading was also raised in this report but not firmly advocated by the U.S.xvi
Although the “comprehensive” approach advocates the need to consider all aspects of the
climate system when deciding policy, it does not recommend specific policy actions. This
reflects the reluctance of the Bush administration to agree to any committed action.
Instead the administration chose to embrace a “no-regrets” strategy—an approach that
advocates taking only those actions which were justified for other reasons.xvii This idea
was presented in January 1990 by Secretary of State James Baker to the IPCC’s Working
Group III on response strategies.xviii The bottom-up approach of the “no-regrets” strategy
was in conflict with the top-down approach advocated by those countries in favor of
targets and timetables.xix
Throughout the remaining three INC meetings prior to UNCED, the United States, citing
its economic dependency on fossil fuels, remained firm with its refusal to agree to targets
and timetables without solid scientific evidence. The U.S. continued to push for a
comprehensive approach to the problem and for flexibility in the final text to be presented
at UNCED. Realizing the importance of developing country participation in any climate
change solution and the reluctance of developing countries to participate without
financial and technological assistance, the U.S. reluctantly agreed to provide $75 million
to assist developing countries in their efforts to lower emissions--$50 million going to the
GEF and $25 million to country studies.xx
The final text of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), signed at the
1992 UNCED meeting, reflected much of the flexibility and comprehensiveness sought
by the United States. Particular statements include:
Article 3, Paragraph 3: “The Parties should take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its
adverse effects....taking into account that policies and measure to deal with
climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the
lowest possible cost.”
Article 4, Paragraph 2a: “...developed country Parties and other Parties included
in Annex 1 may implement such policies and measures jointly with other Parties
and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of
the Convention...”
Most importantly, the FCCC required each country to submit a report outlining its plan
for reducing emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000—a report that was submitted not
by the Bush administration but by the new Clinton administration.
7The Clinton Years (1992 to present)
The current Clinton administration, although also concerned about the political and
economic costs associated with climate policy action, does not seem as determined to
slow the process as the previous two administrations. Rather than highlighting scientific
uncertainty like the previous two administrations, the Clinton administration is focusing
on the emerging scientific consensus.
The current administration seems most concerned about achieving the political will
necessary to commit to policy action. The Clinton administration began its tenure by
testing this political will. A small BTU tax included as part of the administration’s
proposed budget was immediately shot down suggesting that the public and congress,
although increasingly concerned about climate change, were not at this point willing to
pay to address it.
Acute awareness of the public’s animosity towards taxes is reflected in much of the
administration’s climate change policy responses. As required by the FCCC, the US
submitted its plan in 1993—the Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP)—for stabilizing
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Reflecting the US’s anti-regulatory climate,
the CCAP consisted mainly of extensions to existing programs and voluntary measures
undertaken by US businesses.
The US has been also very active in pursuing “flexible” approaches to emissions
reductions. The US played a dominant role in pushing for inclusion of the language found
in Article 4, Paragraph 2a of the FCCC which allows for joint efforts across parties to
reach the goals of the Convention. The concept of ‘joint implementation’ (JI) was
promoted by the US as a cost-effective approach to achieve the goals of the FCCC by
allowing countries to partially offset their emissions reductions commitments by
financing reductions in other countries. In theory, joint implementation could facilitate
the transfer of financial and technological resources from developed countries to
developing countries as required by the Convention. A decision on JI was to be made at
the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) in March 1995.xxi
Prior to COP-1, the US was busy implementing and promoting its own national JI
program (i.e., the United States Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI) established in
1993) and setting up bilateral and multilateral agreements with other countries. Through
these efforts, the US hoped to influence the decision regarding JI at COP-1 by garnering
support from other countries and by demonstrating the feasibility of such a program.
Although no international JI program with credit was adopted at COP-1, the Berlin
decision allowed for a pilot-phase program, referred to as “activities implemented
jointly” (AIJ), where “no credits shall accrue to any Party as a result of greenhouse gas
emissions reduced or sequestered during the pilot phase from activities implemented
jointly” (Berlin Decision, COP1).
The second COP was held in Geneva, Switzerland in July 1996. At COP-2 it was
acknowledged that the non-binding efforts outlined in individual country plans would not
achieve the goal of stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Coming on the
heels of the IPCC Second Assessment Report released in December 1995 which found
8that “the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence on global climate”
(IPCC [1995]), it was clear that steps towards a binding agreement were needed. As a
result, each country or group of countries was given the opportunity to submit a proposed
draft protocol to be considered for inclusion in a final protocol to be negotiated at COP-3
in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997. These proposed protocols are to be consolidated and
streamlined if possible in a series of meetings of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin
Mandate (AGBM).
Realizing that political acceptance and sustainability of any committed action requires
public and interest group approval, the Clinton administration has recently taken
deliberate steps to gain public and interest group acceptance . For one, the proposed draft
protocol submitted by the US stresses flexibility and comprehensiveness: (1) multi-year
emissions budgets with banking and borrowing between periods; (2) an international
emissions trading program among Annex 1 countries (and/or countries with binding
targets); and (3) joint implementation between countries with binding targets and
countries without. Conspicuously absent from the US proposal is any mention of
emissions targets and timetables—an omission that has led many countries to question
the US’s seriousness in addressing the problem.
The current administration has also recently made deliberate steps domestically to garner
public support for a future binding commitment. For one, Vice President Gore has
established a series of public workshops on the subject to be held across the country
which will highlight the possible catastrophic consequences of climate change. In
addition, the administration has instituted the “Interagency Analysis Team” (coordinated
by the Department of Commerce) which is charged with providing modeling results and
economic analyses on the impacts of specific policies. This information will be provided
to policymakers in the form of briefing documents and will be presented at public
conferences.
A Model of Policy Instrument Prominence
Choosing the set of appropriate policy instruments to reach particular policy goals is not a
mere exercise in determining which instruments in an economic sense are most efficient
or cost-effective. It involves choosing from a set of instruments constrained by various
contextual factors (e.g., political and economic climate) given the current policy goals
and the knowledge, perceptions, and interests of the different actor groups.
The case of policy instrument prominence in the United States can be usefully described
using a variant on the model of public policy-making introduced by John Kingdon
(Kingdon [1995]). In Kingdon’s model three process streams (i.e., problem recognition,
formation of policy proposals, and politics) develop and operate largely independently of
each other coming together in a “policy window” (i.e., a window of time when conditions
allow for the joining of problem with solution). I modify this model slightly to fit the case
of study in this paper. In particular, I emphasize the importance of historical experience
by drawing out the time dimensionality of the model--a feature implicit in Kingdon’s
model.
9The Policy Instrument “Primeval Soup”
At any point in time a pool of possible policy instruments exists to address a particular
policy problem. Policy instruments “float around” in the pool with some bubbling to the
top and others sinking to the bottom. Kingdon uses the analogy of the “primeval soup” of
biological natural selection (i.e., molecules float around with some surviving and others
not) to describe the process of public policy selection. The key concept to take away from
this analogy is that it is rarely the case that new policy instruments are added to the pool.
Rather, policy instruments that rise in prominence are typically policy instruments that
have been floating around for years or have been modified, combined, or repackaged to
fit the current situation.
Factors influencing not only which instruments are found in the pool but more
importantly which ones float to the top and which ones sink to the bottom are captured in
three process streams (similar to Kingdon’s model) shown in Figure 1: a
“politics/economics” stream; a “policy options” stream; and an “issues” stream. The
“politics/economics” stream comprises factors such as public mood (e.g., conservative vs.
liberal), views in the current administration and congress, and macroeconomic
conditions—each of which affect the prominence of particular policy instruments. The
“policy options” stream contains the actual proposals or policy alternatives generated by
a policy community composed of academics, researchers, bureaucrats, interest groups,
etc.  Lastly, the “policy issues” stream is comprised of particular policy issues or policy
goals for which a solution is sought. These issues or goals have an obvious influence on
the type of instruments that rise to the top in prominence. Although not entirely
independent of one another, these process streams operate largely independently. At
times certain policy issues are given higher priority because a solution is known to exist.
However, in most cases issues gain prominence on the public policy agenda
independently of the policy options stream.
Changes in any of these three streams can cause a “stirring of the pot” with certain
instruments floating to the top, others sinking to the bottom, and some staying at the same
level of prominence. Changes in these three streams, however, are not the only stimuli to
cause a stirring of the pot--time is also important. Changes in the streams can cause a
sudden stirring of the pot, but between these stirrings there is still a slow movement of
ideas in the pot--e.g., the public becomes more comfortable with an idea the longer it is
discussed, or positive historical experience with a particular instrument in another setting
may increase public acceptance of such an instrument in the current policy setting.
Figure 1 attempts to capture the multiple dimensions of policy instrument prominence in
graphical form. The pool of possible policy instruments moves through time with
additions from the “policy options” stream. Some instruments float to the top of the pool
in prominence affected by the three streams described above and time. These three
streams and the importance of history are elaborated below. This model differs from the
actor models found in the political science literature which focus on the interactions
between the various actor groups to describe public policy-making. Instead this model
focuses on processes which are influenced by the various actor groups.
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The “Politics/Economics” Stream
The “politics/economics” stream is composed of political and economic factors which are
largely independent of the specific policy issue at hand yet affect the prominence of
policy instruments in the pool. These factors include: (1) the political and economic
climate; (2) public knowledge and perceptions; and (3) the knowledge, perceptions, and
ideology of policymakers within the administration and congress.
Political and Economic Climate
What stands out from tracing US policy responses since the 1970’s is the dominant role
political and economic factors have played in policy instrument prominence. Segmenting
history into administrations is useful since changes in the administration are correlated
with shifts in the types of policy instruments considered and promoted. Republican
administrations have occupied the White House in twelve of the last 16 years and is
reflective of the general trend toward more conservative views in the US—including the
desire for less government and a movement towards more market-based approaches to
governmental regulation. As Hahn and Stavins argue, this shift towards more
conservative views has led to increased acceptance of market-based environmental policy
instruments.xxii
Some market-based instruments (e.g., environmental taxes), however, are not widely
accepted by the US public. As part of a general trend towards more conservative views,
most US taxpayers are against the creation or expansion of federal programs funded by
tax dollars; rather, they support a less centralized government and deregulation of
industry where desired actions of private businesses are induced through market
mechanisms. This sentiment and the public’s concern over a ballooning national debt
help explain the U.S.’s reluctance to fund a centralized investment fund like the GEF and
the U.S.’s current endorsement of market-based mechanisms like international emissions
trading or joint implementation. The anti-tax mood resulting from this general trend was
made clear in the rejection of Clinton’s proposed BTU tax in 1993 and pushes policy
instruments based on taxes (which from an economic sense may be more efficient) down
to the bottom of the pool of policy instruments.
The US public’s lack of trust in the government to spend tax dollars wisely and public
concern over large federal budget deficits could also explain the scarcity of support for
increased energy R&D funding as an policy instrument to hedge against future abatement
costs. This sentiment was fed by the series of poor (ex-post) energy R&D funding
decisions made by the Carter administration contributing to a steep decline in federal
energy R&D funding by the Reagan administration in the 1980’s. Federally-funded
energy R&D programs are unlikely to make a large comeback and, according to the
policymakers I spoke with, the emphasis is now on developing programs that will induce
private firms to engage in energy R&D. Although it can be argued that both privately-
induced and federally-funded R&D are needed (federally-funded R&D for long-term
R&D efforts in which private firms are reluctant to engage and privately-induced R&D
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for the commercialization of newly developed technologies), significant increases in
federally-funded R&D efforts seem unlikely in the near future.
Economic factors are also key determinants of policy instrument prominence. The US
economy is highly fossil fuel-intensive, leading to the rejection of any policy which
significantly restricts fossil fuel use. It is believed that significantly restricting fossil fuel
use would be not only detrimental to the US domestic economy but would also have
major implications for US competitiveness in the global economy—a primary concern of
US policymakers.xxiii These factors help explain the US’s policy stance over the years--the
continued reluctance to agree to emissions targets and timetables; the push for a
“comprehensive” approach (i.e., the consideration of all greenhouse gases (not just CO2)
and all sources and sinks (not just energy sources)); and the endorsement of policy
instruments that allow the purchase of reductions elsewhere (e.g., tradable permits, joint
implementation).
Public Knowledge and Perceptions
The public’s understanding and perceptions of particular policy instruments also
influence which instruments are most seriously considered. Full understanding of the
issues surrounding policy instrument choice requires some level of expertise in the theory
and application of these instruments—expertise that many citizens do not and care not to
possess. As discussed in Hahn and Stavins [1991], unless directly affected by the
regulation, citizens may choose to remain “rationally ignorant” of the issues surrounding
policy instrument choice—instead basing their opinions on limited knowledge,
perceptions, and ideology.
This “rational ignorance” of the US public regarding policy instruments creates a
tendency towards instruments that possess certain characteristics. First, industry is many
times considered the “bad guy” by the US public; therefore, an instrument which forces
industry to pay (although in most cases consumers will end up paying indirectly) will be
preferred by policymakers over an instrument that directly affects US consumers.
Second, policymakers will tend to prefer an instrument that hides the true abatement costs
from the US publicxxiv—e.g., an environmental tax makes costs transparent while tradable
permits and technology standards do not. Lastly, policymakers prefer instruments that are
perceived to be cost-effective by the US public—i.e., instruments that obtain the
environmental goal at least-cost. Market-based approaches have been shown in theory to
be the least-cost approach to environmental protection and have been slowly gaining
favor.
“Rational ignorance” also causes the US public to anchor on one policy instrument as the
tool to solve all environmental problems. Most economists believe that the optimal
choice of instrument is dependent on a set of criteria implying it is not the case that one
instrument is best for all circumstances. This is evident in chapter 11 of the IPCC Second
Assessment Report of Working Group III where a comprehensive review of all
instruments is presented. However, the expertise required to understand the tradeoffs
between instruments causes some to anchor on an instrument rather than on a set of
criteria. For the variety of reasons discussed, the instrument du jour is tradable permits
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although its feasibility and true potential for significantly lowering abatement costs in the
US by purchasing reductions elsewhere may be a bit exaggerated.
The public’s affection for tradable permits and its belief that such an instrument will
significantly lower abatement costs have played a role in the US’s recent push for an
international tradable permits market. As discussed in Hahn and Stavins [1991], although
the policy “goal” choice and the policy “instrument” choice should be separate, they are
inextricably linked. The US public and interest groups will be more willing to accept
stricter environmental goals if they believe the costs associated with attainment of these
goals are reasonable. This point was emphasized by a number of individuals I spoke with
leaving me with the impression that the impetus behind the current push by the US for a
tradable permits program may be to gain public acceptance of a binding target and
timetable.
Knowledge, Perceptions, and Ideology of Policymakers
The issues arising out of the limits to public knowledge discussed above also apply to
policymakers. The reason for a policymaker’s lack of understanding of the theory behind
policy instrument choice, however, is likely not a conscious choice by the policymaker to
be “rationally ignorant.” Rather, many policymakers lack the time and appropriate
training in fields such as economics to understand the nuances of policy instrument
choice causing these policymakers to also anchor on an instrument rather than a set of
evaluative criteria. As discussed in Hahn and Stavins [1991], political scientist Steven
Kelman (Kelman [1981]) interviewed both Democrats and Republicans on the
congressional staff and found that although the two groups held opposite views of
market-based approaches to environmental regulation, neither group understood the
theory and issues behind these instruments! Rather, their opinions seemed to be based on
ideology.
Many instruments are appealing to policymakers for political reasons. In contrast with
regulatory (i.e., command-and-control) instruments, market-based instruments tend to
depoliticize the policy debate by allowing firms (rather than regulators) to decide how to
best meet emissions targets.xxv This can also help explain many policymakers’ affection
for market-based instruments. Lastly, the importance of individual players in the
policymaking process should not be underestimated. With each change in the
administration, a new political structure including a new set of policymakers in key
positions with different levels of knowledge, perceptions, and interests is introduced.
Congress also influences the prominence of policy instruments within the pool even
though members of Congress are not directly involved in the international climate
negotiations. The fact that Congress must ratify any international agreement is
permanently in the back of the minds of US negotiators. It is also a probable factor
influencing the US’s reluctance to propose specific targets and timetables. In other
countries, it is likely that the policymakers involved in the international negotiations are
also involved in the ratification of any agreement. This grants these individuals some
freedom to negotiate specific policy actions.xxvi Due to the separation of powers in the US,
US negotiators are not granted this freedom.
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The views of other countries also play into the US’s decision of which policy instruments
to promote in international negotiations since the US may be reluctant to propose an
instrument that will be immediately shot down by other countries. The importance of
considering other countries’ views is evident from the recent Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin
Mandate (AGBM) meetings held in March 1997 in Bonn, Germany. The US’s proposal
for multi-year emissions budgets and emissions trading, banking, and borrowing without
any mention of emissions targets and timetables was largely received with negative
reaction by representatives of other countries.
The consideration of other countries’ interests was also important during the negotiations
leading up to the Rio conference in 1992. Developing countries were reluctant to
participate in any climate agreement without the guarantee of financial and technological
assistance. To allay these concerns, the US volunteered to commit to a level of funding to
the Global Environment Facility.xxvii Lastly, historical experience with particular
instruments not only explains the type of instruments promoted by the US over time but
also the type of instrument advocated by other countries. The fact that other countries
have had less experience with emissions trading than the US could help explain the
contrast in support for this instrument between the US and other countries.
The “Policy Options” Stream
Unlike the “politics/economics” stream which affects the pool of policy instruments
through changes in factors largely external to the policy issue at hand (e.g., shifts in
national mood, changes in macroeconomic conditions, and changes in the ideological
composition of the administration and congress), the “policy options” stream affects the
pool of policy instruments through conscious efforts by the policy community to add to
the existing pool or to promote particular instruments. Similar to the “policy” stream in
Kingdon’s model, the “policy options” stream in Figure 1 affects the pool of policy
instruments in two ways: (1) by adding instruments to the pool through the development
of new instruments and the modification, combination, or repackaging of existing
instruments; and (2) by changing the level of prominence of instruments already in the
pool. Various actor groups within the policy community can affect the “policy options”
stream by generating policy instruments to add to the pool and/or by advocating the use
or disuse of particular instruments.
Although the policy community generating the policy instruments found in the pool of
instruments comprises a number of different actor groups (e.g., academics, researchers,
interest groups, bureaucrats, individual policymakers), the source of the majority of
policy instruments found in the pool is typically academics and researchers--individuals
which, to a large extent, make up the assessment community. As emphasized by
Kingdon, this community of specialists acts largely independently of events occurring in
the “politics/economics” stream such as changes in the administration or macroeconomic
conditions. The advantages and disadvantages of the various types of instruments
(technological, market, regulatory, and institutional) have been presented and debated
throughout the academic literature and at conferences for years in the context of a number
of different policy issues. Moreover, these instruments have been used in various policy
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settings to address issues other than climate change allowing comparisons to be made and
lessons to be learned.
As stressed by Kingdon, the origins of policy options, however, are less important than
the process of modifying, combining, repackaging and/or promoting policy instruments--
the process that influences which policy instruments rise to the top of the pool in
prominence and are discussed seriously in policy circles. As elaborated below, the types
of instruments added to the pool and promoted within the pool are reflective of (1) the
nature of the policy issue; (2) the interests, perceptions, and ideology of the various actor
groups within the policy community; and (3) the channels through which information
flows from the policy community to policymakers.
Nature of the Policy Issue
The climate change issue has certain characteristics that drive the type of policy
instruments seriously considered. First, key scientific uncertainties still exist causing US
policymakers to argue for an instrument that is both flexible and adaptable allowing for
changes as uncertainties are resolved. Second, the issue is intertemporal and global in
nature. Cumulative (not daily or yearly) and global (not region-specific) emissions are
what matters for climate. Numerous studies (e.g., IPCC [1995], Manne [1993], Martins et
al [1993], Edmonds et al [1995], and Rose and Stevens [1994]) estimate large cost
savings if nations cooperated to reduce global emissions (through mechanisms such as
emissions trading or joint implementation) rather than if nations reduced emissions
unilaterally. Wigley, Richels and Edmonds [1996] argue that abatement costs could be
cut in half if emissions were allowed to rise in the near term and then reduced sharply
rather than if emissions were reduced immediately. Therefore, a policy instrument that
will result not only in the equalization of marginal abatement costs across regions but
also the equalization of marginal abatement costs across time periods is desirable from a
cost-effective standpoint. The US’s current push for multi-year budgets and banking and
borrowing reflects this desire. Third, the issue is tightly connected with other issues such
as development, energy, and other environmental problems. These other issues are likely
to define which types of policy responses are able to be implemented and thus which
policy instruments could be considered.
Lastly, although some zero or negative cost mitigation options may exist to provide a
small share of the emissions reductions needed, the sum of efforts to adequately address
the climate change issue is expected to be costly. Unlike the ozone issue where a low cost
alternative existed which can explain the willingness of countries to commit to action, no
such low-cost alternative currently exists to address the entire climate change problem.
This fact constrains the type of policy instruments that can be utilized. Since the marginal
cost curve of abatement options for addressing climate change is believed to become
steeper as the level of abatement rises, it has been shown that as we approach the steeper
part of the curve policy instruments such as command-and-control are unlikely to
work.xxviii Instead more innovative solutions which allow firms to choose their method of
abatement and to avoid the steeper part of the marginal cost curve by purchasing
reductions from other sources are needed. The current proposal for an Annex 1-only
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tradable permits program is unlikely to result in the ability of US firms to purchase a
large share of their required reductions from other countries—instead such a program
may allow these firms to avoid the steeper part of their MC curves.
“Policy Entrepreneurs”
Specific actors within the policy community can play a significant role in determining
which instruments percolate to the top of the pool of policy instruments. These actor
groups include firms, environmental advocacy groups, bureaucrats, academics and
researchers, and individual policymakers. Kingdon refers to these policy advocates as
“policy entrepreneurs”--i.e., individuals or groups of individuals advocating the use or
disuse of particular policy instruments based on their interests, perceptions and ideology.
Activities of these “policy entrepreneurs” not only include advocacy of particular
instruments, but also efforts to “soften up” the public and policy community to certain
policy approaches through education and promotional activities. For instance, deliberate
attempts have been made in the past to educate industry and environmental advocacy
groups on the merits of market-based approaches to environmental regulation. These
attempts have caused a significant increase in acceptance of these types of instruments.
As explained by Kingdon, policy proposals which deviate significantly from the status
quo will fall flat if no efforts were previously made to get the public and policy
community comfortable with certain policy approaches.
Firms
Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins [1997] have explored in a domestic context why, from an
economic standpoint, firms advocate the use of certain policy instruments. Some of the
explanations given by the authors apply in an international context as well. In particular,
the authors attribute a firm’s promotion of particular policy instruments to three factors:
1. whether the instrument lowers the total industry’s cost of compliance: market-based
instruments hold the highest potential for achieving the lowest cost of compliance for
the total industry and from this standpoint should be desirable to firms.xxix
2. whether the instrument offers rents and entry barriers: A tradable permits program
based on a grandfathered allocation scheme (i.e., permits allocated based on past
emissions) is likely to result in rents to the grandfathered firms and to erect entry
barriers to newer (perhaps less polluting) facilities. Therefore, grandfathered firms
that stand to gain from such an allocation scheme are likely to advocate such a policy
instrument.
3. whether the instrument provides differential costs of compliance across industries: A
policy instrument that results in differential costs across firms thus creating winners
and losers will also affect an industry’s support for that instrument.
A firm’s promotion of particular policy instruments is also based on political factors. The
current anti-regulatory climate in the US provides firms the strength to successfully argue
for voluntary efforts rather than mandatory regulations.xxx This is evident from the
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pervasive use of voluntary measures in the Climate Change Action Plan submitted by the
US government in response to the FCCC. In addition to voluntary measures, firms have
come to embrace the idea of market-based instruments due to the ability of these
instruments to decriminalize polluting activities. By allowing firms the choice of “paying
to pollute” rather than imposing fines, market-based instruments create the perception
that the polluting activity is acceptable.xxxi
Environmental Advocacy Groups
As discussed in Keohane, Revesz and Stavins [1997], an environmental advocacy
group’s choice of which policy instrument to support is not only a reflection of the
group’s environmental goals, but also a reflection of the group’s desire for increased
membership and donor contributions. Supporting an instrument which is chosen by
policymakers and identifiable with the environmental advocacy group is apt to increase
the group’s visibility and lead to increased membership and contributions. This is likely
the story behind the Environmental Defense Fund’s strong support for market-based
approaches while other environmental advocacy groups have in the past rejected such
instruments.xxxii It is also the case that in the past the majority of individuals who staff
environmental advocacy groups is trained in the legal field—not economics. This creates
a tendency for these groups to support regulatory rather than market-based approaches.xxxiii
In my recent discussions with individuals involved in the formulation of the US’s policy
stance in the international climate change negotiations, many of the environmental
advocacy groups seem to now support market-based approaches to address the climate
change problem. This could largely be the result of these groups’ realization that to
secure public acceptance of a binding commitment, instruments which provide the
perception that costs will be minimized must be proposed. For these groups, the end is in
many cases more important than the means and some agreement for policy action is
better than nothing.
Deliberate attempts have been made by environmental advocacy groups to promote
particular policy responses and to educate the public. In 1987, for instance, Irving
Mintzer of the World Resources Institute (WRI) published an assessment report which
compared various policy scenarios (Mintzer [1987]). Although not explicit on the exact
policy instruments to implement, government subsidies to promote energy efficiency and
renewables usage and taxes on energy seem to be implied. Although successful from the
standpoint of increased visibility for Mintzer and WRI, the assessment did little to spur
policy action or increase the prominence of these policy instruments.
A 1990 Greenpeace report edited by Jeremy Leggett of Greenpeace (Leggett [1990]) was
also an attempt to spur policy action. This report concludes with an endorsement of the
“precautionary principle” (i.e., even if the science is uncertain, action should be taken as
a precaution to irreversible environmental damage)--a policy view supported at the time
by many of the European countries, but not by the U.S.
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Bureaucrats
Similar to environmental advocacy groups, individuals within the bureaucracy have in the
past been largely trained in the legal field. Since understanding market-based instruments
requires some form of economics training, the composition of the bureaucracy in the past
could explain the slow penetration of market-based instruments in US environmental
policy.xxxiv  A comparison of a 1983 EPA assessment report titled, “Can We Delay a
Greenhouse Warming” (Seidel [1983]) with the 1990 EPA assessment report titled,
“Policy Options for Stabilizing Global Climate” (Lashof and Tirpak [1990]) shows a
visible shift in the types of instruments promoted by the USEPA. The 1983 EPA report
advocates the use of regulatory instruments such as fuel bans and CO2 scrubbing in
addition to taxes on emissions. The later 1990 EPA report advocates an extended set of
instruments beyond regulations and standards including a number of market instruments
such as carbon taxes and other financial mechanisms; institutional instruments such as
assistance and loan programs; and technological instruments such as energy R&D
funding.
Other assessments produced by some federal agencies reflect a firm policy stance of the
White House. A 1985 DOE assessment report (DOE [1985]), providing support for the
Reagan administration’s policy position of no committed action, advocated continued
research rather than policy action citing key unresolved scientific uncertainties.
Rather than providing support for a policy stance already held by the administration,
some assessments prepared by federal agencies have played a significant role in bringing
attention to certain policy instruments. One report in particular is the 1991
“Comprehensive” report prepared by Richard Stewart and Jonathan Wiener of the Justice
Department (Stewart and Wiener [1991]). As discussed earlier, the ideas presented in this
report were prepared at the explicit request of the Bush White House to provide
recommendations for appropriate policy responses to the climate negotiations. The
concepts put forth in this report were presented by the US at the first INC meeting in
February 1991 and are still an integral part of the US’s current policy position.
The recent formation of the Interagency Analysis Team is an important example of an
assessment process that is specifically set up to inform policymakers (and also interest
groups and the public) on the impacts of various policy options. Although it is too early
to tell, such an assessment that is specifically commissioned by policymakers is likely to
have a larger impact than those assessments which are developed without such a request.
Individual Policymakers
With each change in the administration, a new political structure including a new set of
policymakers in key positions with different levels of knowledge, perceptions, and
interests is introduced. There are various channels through which information flows to
policymakers which influence policymakers’ knowledge and perceptions of policy
instruments. Although formal (i.e., report-like) assessment documents like the IPCC
assessments reports have had less of a direct influence on policymakers, information
found in these documents have taken an indirect route to these policymakers through
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advisors. These advisors are many times directly involved in the assessment process and
are able to transfer the knowledge gained in the process to policymakers in the form of
briefings. As discussed previously, many policymakers lack the time and expertise
necessary to understand the tradeoffs between the various policy instruments. This can
lead policymakers to depend heavily upon their advisors (e.g., the Council of Economic
Advisors, university professors) trained in economics to propose the appropriate action to
take.
Individual policymakers can also play the role of a “policy entrepreneur” by advocating
the use or disuse of particular instruments. Notable examples include the promotion of
the “no-regrets” strategy in 1990 by then-Secretary of State James Baker and the
promotion of market-based approaches (in particular, emissions trading) by Tim Wirth,
Undersecretary of State and former Senator. Deliberate attempts have also been made to
inform the public. Vice President Gore’s scheduling of public workshops to be held on
the issue across the country in mid-1997 is a deliberate attempt to inform the public in
hopes that public acceptance of a binding commitment will be achieved.
Academics and researchers
As previously discussed, the source of most of the instruments found in the pool of policy
instruments is the academic and research community. Individuals within academia or the
research community not only generate policy instruments that go into the pool, but can
also play the role of “policy entrepreneur” by advocating the use of certain instruments.
One example of this is the Project ‘88 report (Wirth and Heinz [1988])--edited by Robert
Stavins at the request of Senators Heinz and Wirth--which advocated the use of market
instruments where appropriate to deal with domestic environmental problems. This report
brought the idea of market instruments to the attention of Senator Wirth who is now a key
climate policy maker and negotiator within the Department of State.
Assessment bodies such as the National Research Council (NRC) and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)--bodies made up of distinguished
scientists and researchers--were established to inform the policy community through
vehicles such as formal (i.e., report-like) assessments. With regard to policy instruments,
these formal assessments have played a lesser role than some of the “informal”
assessments (e.g., memos, reports) discussed above in defining which instruments are
seriously considered in policy discussions. The early NRC reports (NRC [1977], NRC
[1979], and NRC [1983]) focus more on the science and avoid making policy
recommendations other than to advocate increased research funding. The NRC [1991]
report discusses mitigation and adaptation options but does little to recommend the
implementation of particular policy instruments to induce the policy measures (e.g.,
increased energy efficiency and conservation) highlighted in the report.
The IPCC’s First and Second Assessment Reports (IPCC [1990], IPCC [1995]) go further
in discussing particular mechanisms for implementing desired response strategies. The
1990 IPCC report, “Climate Change: The IPCC Response Strategies,” presents a
comprehensive list of possible instruments (i.e., regulations, emissions trading, emissions
charges, subsidies, and sanctions), but does not explicitly advocate the use of any
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particular set of instruments. The IPCC’s Second Assessment Report (IPCC [1995]) also
includes a chapter on policy instruments and takes an approach similar to the First
Assessment Report by presenting the full suite of instruments without recommending the
use of any particular set of instruments.
Lastly, vehicles other than assessment reports can be used by academics and researchers
to press for particular policy responses. One example is the recent “economist’s
statement” signed by 2000 members of the American Economic Association and others
which asserted that “the most efficient approach to slowing climate change is through
market-based policies” and that “in order for the world to achieve its climatic objectives
as minimum cost, a cooperative approach among nations is required--such as an
international emissions trading agreement.” This statement, sponsored by the non-profit
organization Redefining Progress, was sent primarily to members of the AEA for
endorsement and distributed to “leaders in the public and private sectors” and to the
media at a press conference held February 13, 1997. This statement was received with
mixed response by those in the government--some holding it up as an endorsement of the
US’s current policy position while others feeling that the economists were “speaking out
of turn.” The statement seems to have done little except to provide support for the US’s
push for an international emissions trading program.
The “Issues” Stream
As depicted in Figure 1, the policy issue at hand also influences the type of instruments
that rise to the top of the policy instruments pool. As is the case with most policy issues,
the evolution of the climate change issue over time has involved various policy stages--
each supporting a different policy goal. The goal in the early stages of the climate change
issue was to determine whether human activities had any discernible influence on the
global climate. The issue then entered a policy stage where the goal was to acquire
international cooperation to address the issue and has now entered a stage where
agreement on an environmental goal and how to best achieve it is the policy goal.
These shifts in the U.S.’s climate change policy goals over time are reflected in the type
of policy instruments prominent in policy discussions over time.  From the 1970’s until
the late 1980’s the “policy goal” was to determine whether a climate change problem
existed resulting in policy responses of the “technological” type—i.e., increased funding
in climate research and, until the 1980’s, increased funding in energy R&D.
Policy instruments were added to this portfolio once it became apparent that a climate
problem likely existed and the policy goal shifted to one of obtaining international
agreement on the issue. This goal required instruments that would persuade the various
countries to participate in an agreement—an “institutional” instrument (the Global
Environmental Facility) to obtain developing country participation and a “market”
instrument (e.g., joint implementation) to obtain developed country participation. After
the signing of the FCCC in Rio in 1992, the policy goal shifted to achieving committed
action from each of the participants. Since the US will be obliged to cover a large share
of the total cost of any agreement, the US needs to propose instruments that could lower
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this cost significantly in order to gain public acceptance for a binding commitment. Such
instruments are found in the recent protocol submitted by the US—international tradable
permits and joint implementation, banking and borrowing, and multi-year carbon
emissions budgets.
Up to the signing of the FCCC in 1992, the policy process was one of first determining
the policy goal and then choosing the appropriate instrument to achieve that goal.
However, it is not the case that the means (i.e., the policy instrument) and end (i.e., the
policy goal) can be easily separated. In reality, environmental policy goals are a function
of costs—the lower the cost, the stricter the goal. Economists argue for environmental
goals based on cost-benefit—i.e., an optimal level of abatement where total net benefit is
maximized or the abatement level where marginal benefit equals marginal cost. However,
in actuality policymakers choose environmental goals based on costs and political
considerations with little attention given to benefits. That is, policymakers prefer an
environmental goal that is reasonable from a cost standpoint to achieve universal
participation with the thought that if costs turn out to be lower, the goal could be made
stricter.
This is the clear strategy in the recent international negotiations over targets and
timetables. It is likely that an arbitrary goal based on the ability of all participants to
reach it will emerge with little thought given to whether this goal achieves the objective
of the FCCC to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations...at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”—a statement which
seems to suggest a firm environmental goal.
The Influence of Time and Historical Experience
The passage of time and historical experience have a large influence on policy instrument
prominence. In addition to the deliberate attempts by “policy entrepreneurs” to promote
particular instruments, the simple passage of time may also increase the public’s and
policy community’s comfortableness with certain policy approaches. This could be the
result of increased experience with particular instruments in another policy setting or the
length of time the policy instrument has been discussed in policy circles. As implied in
Kingdon’s concept of “softening up” or Lindblom’s concept of “incrementalism”
(Lindblom [1959])--i.e., new policies are typically the result of incremental changes to
existing policies rather than comprehensive rational decision-making across all policy
options--the public and policy community are inherently risk averse and thus reluctant to
support large policy changes. They prefer policies that have been proven successful in the
past or in other policy settings, or are incremental changes to policies already in place.
Emissions trading is a prime example of an instrument that has risen in popularity in a
large part as a result of time and historical experience. Prior to the 1980’s, regulatory
instruments (e.g., technology or performance standards) were the instrument of choice in
the US to deal with domestic environmental problems. The US began experimenting with
domestic emissions trading with the introduction of the EPA’s Emissions Trading
Program in 1974. This was followed by the Lead Trading program initiated in 1982, CFC
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trading in the late 1980’s, and SO2 trading as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990.xxxv
Much of the stimulus behind the US’s current proposal for an international tradable
permits program comes from the “success” of the Acid Rain SO2 Allowance Trading
program. This program is considered successful for a number of reasons, especially: (a)
allowance prices have turned out to be much lower than expected; and (b) the program
was supported by both industry and environmental groups.
Historical experience is also a major factor in explaining the recent shift in emphasis
away from joint implementation and institutional instruments such as the GEF to an
international emissions trading program. Although the current international joint
implementation program (i.e., “Activities Implemented Jointly”) does not allow for
project credit, problems such as transactions costs associated with the project-based and
single-year target features of a joint implementation program limit the ability of such a
program to achieve the magnitude of reductions necessary to contend with the climate
change problem.xxxvi Recent experience with the GEF also suggests that such a mechanism
is unable to reach the necessary level of technological cooperation between developed
and developing countries.xxxvii
Lastly, the importance of “institutional history” should not be overlooked since once an
institutional structure is put in place, it is difficult to get rid of it. Institutional history in
some sense guarantees the coexistence of multiple policy instruments since mechanisms
such as the GEF and joint implementation are unlikely to be dissolved. Instead, policy
instruments are incrementally added to the portfolio of policy instruments already in
existence. The reality of institutional history means that policymakers must account for
policy instruments already in place when deciding which to add to the portfolio.
Therefore, existing instruments also constrain a policymaker’s choice of instrument.
The reality of institutional history can also lead to a strategic choice of policy
instruments. Although it may seem premature to worry about the type of instrument to
implement prior to deciding the goal, by pushing for the implementation of an Annex 1-
only international tradable permits program the US is in some sense guaranteeing that
such a mechanism will be used when non-Annex 1 countries are brought on board.
Schmalensee [1996], however, highlights the pitfalls of such a strategy by pointing out
that initially leaving developing countries out of an international tradable permits
program could make these countries reluctant to join later since in the interim these
countries are likely to specialize in production that involves high carbon-emitting
processes.
The “Policy Window”
Combining the Three Streams
In Kingdon’s model, the combination of problem with solution occurs when the three
streams come together in a “policy window”--i.e., a window of time when political and
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economic conditions allow for the joining of a particular solution with an existing policy
issue. In an attempt to uncover these possible “joinings” over time, a juxtaposition of the
three streams plus a list of actions taken over time is provided in Figure 2.
What emerges from a comparison of the three streams is their seemingly independence
from one another and the dominant role external events and issue momentum play in the
actions taken over time. Although the formal assessments listed under the “policy
options” stream at times echo the US’s current policy position, few seem to have been a
major factor influencing this position. In fact, in many instances there seems to be a
disconnect between the policy position held by the US and the recommendations put
forth in the assessments. Although formal assessments seem to have had little direct
impact on US policy positions, it may not be the case that they have had no indirect
impact or will fail to have a larger impact in the future.
The Role of Formal Assessments
As discussed above, the channels through which information flows to high-level
policymakers is usually in the form of discussions with advisors (e.g., the Council of
Economic Advisors and university professors), briefing documents, and memos—not
formal assessments. Formal assessments, however, are many times the source of
information. For instance, many policy advisors are involved in formal assessments
processes like the IPCC.  Therefore, information found in formal assessments are likely
to be passed on to policymakers but through different channels.  In my discussions with
one of the authors of chapter 11 (“Policy Instruments”) of the IPCC’s Second Assessment
Report, I was told that the intended audience of the chapter was not so much
policymakers involved in the international negotiations, but rather those who would be
advising these policymakers on matters of policy instrument choice. Given the
importance of advisors in policymaking, this seems like the appropriate choice. Also,
assessments are used in many cases to support an already developed policy choice. This
would suggest that assessments with recommendations that support an existing view
would have a larger impact although it may not be the case that the assessment actually
informed that view.
Another possible explanation for the seemingly lack of impact assessments have had over
the years may be that in the past the overarching policy goal that assessors assume when
making policy recommendations has been vastly different from the policy goals that
policymakers actually face. As discussed earlier in this paper, the climate change issue
over time has entered various stages in the issue evolutionary cycle--each supporting a
different policy goal. There are various goals that must be achieved prior to setting a
specific environmental goal—e.g., obtaining universal participation in an international
agreement. However, it seems that a well-specified environmental goal (e.g., stabilizing
carbon emissions at 1990 levels) is typically what assessors assume when they weigh the
various policy options. This environmental goal may not be the goal that policymakers
are striving to achieve at the current stage of the issue cycle.  Rather than being
irrelevant, however, the assessment’s recommendations may just be premature. If this
hypothesis is correct, then it seems that the lack of direct impact of assessments may
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change in the near future as the policy goals of policymakers begin to shift towards
environmental targets and the gap between the policy goals of policymakers and
assessors narrows.
Lastly, reflecting the general theme of this paper, the discussion of policy options and
policy instrument choice in assessments tend to overlook the contextual factors that
constrain the types of instruments policymakers can actually consider. This point is also
stressed by Kingdon: “Proposals that fail to meet these criteria--technological feasibility,
value acceptability within the policy community, tolerable cost, anticipated public
acquiescence, and a reasonable chance for receptivity among elected decision makers--
are not likely to be considered as serious, viable proposals....A proposal that survives
usually satisfies these criteria” (Kingdon [1995]). For instance, chapter 11 of the IPCC’s
Second Assessment report provides a comprehensive list of all possible policy
instruments without consideration for which instruments are politically feasible. The
“Comprehensive” report, on the other hand, seems to reflect the constraints that
policymakers were facing at the time and has had more of a direct impact.
Tom Schelling has emphasized that, in the case of policy instrument choice, economists
tend to focus too much on elegant instruments and not enough on instruments that are
politically feasible.xxxviii This fact could help explain the lack of direct impact assessments
have had in terms of policy instrument prominence.
What Constitutes A ‘Successful’ Assessment?
In light of the discussion above, we can begin to ponder what would it mean for an
assessment to be considered “successful.” In terms of policy instrument choice, possible
criteria for “success” emanating from the discussion in this paper could include the
following:
Was the assessment instrumental in advancing the environmental issue to
the next stage in the issue cycle?
Informational factors such as formal assessments can influence policy instrument
prominence indirectly by affecting the current policy goals policymakers face. Applying
this criterion, it would seem that the Villach 1985 assessment should be considered
successful since it was a significant factor in shifting the policy goal from one of
determining whether a climate change problem exists to achieving international
agreement on concerted policy actions.
Did the assessment contribute to the loosening of constraints that define
the set of “feasible” policy instruments?
Informational factors can also affect (a) the contextual factors found in the
“politics/economics” stream (i.e., political and economic climate; public knowledge and
perceptions; and the knowledge, perceptions, and ideology of policymakers within the
administration and Congress), and (b) the opinions of the policy community. By
24
educating the public and interest groups, an assessment can loosen the constraints on the
set of feasible policy instrument thus allowing policymakers to make a better policy
instrument choice. Although not a formal assessment, an example of a conscious effort to
loosen these constraints is the current administration’s scheduling of a series of public
workshops to be held across the country in hopes of raising public concern over the
climate change issue.
Did the assessment provide policy-relevant information to the
policymaker which allows he or she to make a more educated
policy instrument choice?
Informational factors can also influence a policymaker’s knowledge, perceptions, and
interests. For example, involvement in the Project ‘88 report likely helped sell then-
Senator Tim Wirth, a previous adversary of market-based approaches, on the merits of
market-based instruments and likely convinced him that these instruments were
consistent with his political ideology. Wirth, now Undersecretary of State, seems now to
be one of the primary “policy entrepreneurs” of international emissions trading for
climate change within the current administration.
Conclusions
The intent of this paper was to investigate the factors influencing which policy
instruments are seriously considered and promoted by the US in the international climate
change debate and to illuminate the channels through which information flows to
policymakers. This paper finds that policy instrument prominence is dependent on the
following three streams and the influence of time and historical experience: (1) the
“politics/economics” stream which contains contextual factors (such as national mood,
macroeconomic conditions) that constrain the type of policy instruments policymakers
can consider; (2) the “policy options” stream which generates and promotes particular
policy instruments; and (3) the “issues” stream which contains the policy goals faced by
policymakers at the time. Informational mechanisms such as formal assessments can
affect each of these factors in the following ways: (a) by providing information directly
and indirectly to policymakers, the public, and the policy community which causes a shift
in their perceptions, knowledge, and/or interests; (b) by influencing contextual factors
that constrain the feasible set of instruments; and/or (c) by providing information that
causes a shift in policy goals.
One goal of this research was to begin to think about what constitutes a “successful”
assessment from the standpoint of policy instrument choice. This paper advocates that an
assessment should be considered “successful” if it (1) advances the issue by affecting
underlying policy goals; (2) loosens binding constraints on the set of “feasible” policy
instruments allowing policymakers to make a better choice; and/or (3) provides policy-
relevant information to policymakers to allow them to make more educated policy
instrument decisions.
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As stated in the introduction, this paper focuses on international policy instrument choice.
However, the importance of considering domestic policy instruments in conjunction with
international policy instruments should not be understated. As emphasized in Vernon
[1995] and Stavins [1996], domestic policies and international policies should not be
decided separately. The success of one largely depends on the other, and the policy
instrument chosen for one context will affect the instrument chosen for the other.
However, simultaneous consideration of both policies (domestic and international) is not
the US’s current approach and further research is needed to explore the ramifications of
this.
Lastly, this paper focuses solely on the US and on the climate change issue although most
of the lessons learned could be applied to other countries and other environmental issues.
An interesting next step of this research would be to conduct comparative studies of the
US and other countries, and of climate change and other environmental issues.
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